Recursive preferences have found widespread application in representative-agent asset-pricing models and general equilibrium. A majority of these applications exploit two decision-theoretic properties not shared by the standard model of intertemporal choice: (i) agents care about the...

The paper studies infinitely repeated games in which the players' rates of time preference may evolve over time, depending on what transpires in the game. A key result is that in any first best equilibrium of the repeated prisoners' dilemma, the players must eventually cooperate. If we assume...

In a symmetric repeated game with standard preferences, there are no gains from intertemporal trade. In fact, under a suitable normalization of utility, the payoff set in the repeated game is identical to that in the stage game. We show that this conclusion may no longer be true if preferences...

Recursive preferences have found widespread application in representative-agent asset-pricing models and general equilibrium. A majority of these applications exploit two decision-theoretic properties not shared by the standard model of intertemporal choice: (i) agents care about the...

We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu [Efficient design with interdependent valuations, Econometrica, 69(5):1237-1259, 2001] show that efficient and...

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local...

We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend...

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local...

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local...

This paper studies when the presence of a small degree of ambiguity guarantees efficient implementation in general mechanism design settings. First, we show that if approximately efficient allocations are implementable in a Bayesian environment, then exactly efficient allocations are...