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Recent research suggests that auction winners sometimes fall prey to a "bidder's curse", paying more for an item at … auction than they would have paid at a posted price. One explanation for this phenomenon is that bidders are inattentive to … posted prices. We develop a model in which bidders' inattention, and subsequent overbidding, is driven by a rational response …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599360
We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316603
Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We … study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills …. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …
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overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …In this paper we use an experiment to compare a theory of risk aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983
Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending …-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500699
We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially … bid for three goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation … for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions …
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