Using a structural model, we estimate the liquidity multiplier of an interbank network and banks' contributions to systemic risk. To provide payment services, banks hold reserves. Their equilibrium holdings can be strategic complements or substitutes. The former arises when payment velocity is...

Using a regulatory transaction-level dataset of the UK repo market, we examine the determinants of haircuts. We find that transaction maturity and collateral quality is of a first order importance in determining haircuts. We also find that counterparties matter in determining haircuts. Hedge...

Using a unique transaction-level data, we document that only 60% of bilateral repos held by UK banks were backed by high-quality collateral. Banks intermediate repo liquidity among different counterparties and use CCPs to reallocate high-quality collaterals among themselves. Furthermore,...

We study a model where a capital provider learns from the price of a firm’s security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, where speculators all wish to trade like...