The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterising tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings...

Both buyers and sellers of goods and services may bene.t from letting their economic transactions go unrecorded for tax purposes. The supplier reduces his tax burden by underreporting income, whereas the consumer gains from buying a non-taxed lower-priced product. The distributional implications...

Both buyers and sellers of goods and services may benefit from letting their economic transactions go unrecorded for tax purposes. The supplier reduces his tax burden by underreporting income, whereas the consumer gains from buying a non-taxed lower-priced product. The distributional...

Tax evasion can be defined as the circumvention, under any form, of the payment of taxes, duties and contributions owed to the state, in the shelter of the law or eluding the legal provisions. The taxpayers, be they legal persons or natural persons, manifest their desire to defend wealth, of...

We study optimal income taxation in a framework where one's willingness to report his income truthfully is positively correlated with his type. We show that allowing low-productivity types to cheat leads to Pareto-superior outcomes as compared to deterring them, even if audits can be performed...

We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is...