We provide a model that unifies the notion of self-fulfilling banking crises and sovereign debt crises. In this model, a bank run can be contagious by triggering a sovereign default, and vice versa. A deposit insurance scheme can eliminate the adverse equilibrium only if the government can repay...

This essay reviews a cornerstone of the European Banking Union project, the resolution of systemically important banks. The focus is on the inherent conflict between a possible intervention by resolution authorities, conditional on a crisis situation, and effective prevention prior to a crisis....

As the basis for a European regime for resolving failing and failed banks, the European Commission has proposed the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and a regulation establishing a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF). There is a debate...

In May 2014, the European Commission published the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The directive introduces rules on bank resolution and restructuring including a bailin tool. It constitutes the legal foundation underlying the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Member countries of...

We document that creditor losses ("haircuts") during sovereign debt restructurings vary across debt maturity. In our novel dataset on instrument-specific haircuts suffered by private creditors in 1999-2020 we find larger losses on short- than long-term debt, independently of the specific haircut...