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What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts?

Tykvová, Tereza - 2000

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445155

Venture capital contracts : a survey of the recent literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

This paper surveys empirical and theoretical studies of various control mechanisms embedded in venture capital contracts. These mechanisms mitigate incentive problems and opportunistic behavior arising in the uncertain environment of financing young hightechnology enterprises that predominantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473815

Path dependencies in venture capital markets

Schertler, Andrea - 2002

This paper examines the impact of venture capitalists' reputation building and experience accumulation on the genesis of venture capital markets. Venture capitalists must accumulate experience to successfully support high-technology enterprises. They must build reputation, i.e., a track record...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011474799

Comparative advantages of public loan and public equity schemes in venture capital markets

Schertler, Andrea - 2002

Using an agency framework, this paper examines advantages of offering venture capitalists a choice between public equity and loan schemes. Both schemes can be used to promote venture capital investments in hightechnology enterprises since they encourage inexperienced venture capitalists to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011475036

Venture capital contracts : a survey of the recent literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013261118

Moral hazard in VC finance : more expensive than you thought

Tennert, Julius; Lambert, Maria; Burghof, Hans-Peter - 2017

Venture projects are fraught with exogenous market risk and endogenous agency risk. We apply a real options perspective to analyze the investment decision of the venture capitalist (VC) in this set-up. The solutions presented are conflictive: the VC reduces his exposure to exogenous risk by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610084

What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts

Tykvová, Tereza - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428358

Screening and advising by a venture capitalist with a time constraint

Dietz, Martin D. (contributor) - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001981686

Disciplining Delegated Monitors : When Venture Capitalists Fail to Prevent Fraud by Their IPO Firms

Tian, Xuan - 2015

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038213

Venture Capitalists as Principals : Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring

Kaplan, Steven N. - 2010

. Theory has identified three primary ways that the investor / principal can mitigate these conflicts - structuring financial … work and its relation to theory for one prominent class of principals venture capitalists (VCs). The empirical studies … indicate that VCs attempt to mitigate principal-agent conflicts in the three ways suggested by theory. The evidence also shows …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763175

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