We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the...

This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic...

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for...

The objective of the present study is to analyse the effect of technological cooperation on SMEs performance consideringtwo dimensions: technological and economic results. For that purpose, we use a data set containing information about participants in research joint ventures supported by the...

This paper combines the analysis of the R&D cooperation with the strategic trade policy theory. By introducing endogenous formation of research joint venture, we investigate when the research joint venture works as a tool of strategic trade policy, and provide its welfare implications. If R&D...

Purpose – This paper analyzes how Research and Development (R&D) cartelization and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) affect firms that engage in Cournot competition in their product market using a model in which the Home and Foreign firm produce differentiated products and export their total...

We investigate the short- and long-term effects of different types of R&D collaborations on firms, consumers, and the industry. To that end, we consider a differentiated-product market in which firms compete a la Bertrand and invest in process innovation in order to lower the production cost...

We analyze a simple oligopoly model where firms can engage in cost-reducing Ramp;D. We compare two Ramp;D regimes: Ramp;D competition and Ramp;D cooperation where firms can enter in a Research Joint Venture (RJV). We introduce coordination costs for the RJV and examine how these affect the...