This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the coalition … unanimity game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our … conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no …

coalition is given by the sum of the valuations for all other players belonging to it. So far, non-cooperative hedonic games …

I introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

-cooperative solution yields the best results, the noncooperative solution fares worst and the coalition games lie in between, with a broad … coalition of the fiscally more responsible countries and the central bank against the less thrifty countries coming closest to …

We examine the welfare properties, coalition-proofness and order-theoretical structure of the set of Nash equilibria in … games, we prove the equivalence among the set of Nash equilibria, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strong … prove that the fixed points of some "extremal" selections from the joint best reply correspondence are both coalition …

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition … unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our … conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no …