In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments 𝑒𝑖, productivities 𝑝𝑖, and rewards 𝑟𝑖. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes,...

Communities are common in complex networks and play a significant role in the functioning of social, biological, economic, and technological systems. Despite much interest in detecting community structures in complex networks and exploring the effect of communities on collective dynamics, a deep...

We study dynamic network games with two types of players (i.e., heterogeneous players) characterized by their different intrinsic preferences. Instead of calculating the Nash equilibrium, we focus on the asymptotic behavior of an asynchronous best response dynamics. We develop a dynamic approach...

The replicator equation model for the evolution of individual behaviors in a single-species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space is developed as a dynamics on the set of probability measures. Stability of monomorphisms in this model using the weak topology is compared to more...

We consider a network game based on matching pennies with two types of agents, conformists and rebels. Conformists prefer to match the action taken by the majority of her neighbors while rebels like to match the minority. We investigate the simultaneous best response dynamic focusing on the...

This paper describes a general framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence as a function of the estimation error. If a quantal response function satisfies C2 continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity, the graph of QRE...