Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players. The reason is that the "right thing to do" may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players...

This paper proves that the limiting hedging error, considered as a function of ST, exhibits a removable discontinuity at the exercise price.

Replicator dynamics are an increasingly popular device for obtaining (local) solutions of considerably high quality to so-called standard quadratic optimization problems, which consist of finding maxima of (possibly indefinite) quadratic forms over the standard simplex. In the simplest version...

A standard quadratic optimization problem (StQP) consists of nding the largest or smallest value of a (possibly indenite) quadratic form over the standard simplex which is the intersection of a hyperplane with the positive orthant. This NP-hard problem has several immediate real-world...