Because of differences in accrued gains and investors' tax-sensitivity, capital gains "lock-in" varies across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Using this variation, we show that tax lock-in affects funds' governance decisions. Higher tax lock-in decreases the likelihood a...

We examine the potential for selection bias in voluntarily reported hedge fund performance data. We construct a novel set of hedge fund returns that have never been reported to a commercial hedge fund database. These returns allow a direct comparison of performance between funds that choose to...

During the recent financial crisis, more than 30% of hedge fund managers in our sample exercised discretionary authority to restrict investor liquidity using mechanisms such as side pockets and gates. Using a hand-collected dataset of hedge fund investor interests, we examine the determinants of...

We examine the portfolio holdings of Funds of Hedge Funds (FoFs) to identify the channels through which FoFs add value for their clients. FoFs offer access to a diversified portfolio of funds that would be costly for constrained investors to manage on their own. Though we find only limited...

The top 5 percent of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds in 2012 had greater aggregate TNA than the remaining 95 percent of funds combined. This skewness in size has implications for mutual fund research: What is true of the average fund is not necessarily true of the average dollar. We...

We exploit the expiring nature of hedge fund lockups to create a new measure of funding liquidity risk that varies within funds. We find that hedge funds with lower funding risk generate higher returns and this effect is driven by their increased exposure to equity mispricing anomalies. Our...

Using a geographic measure of unethical culture developed by Parsons, Sulaeman and Titman (2018) and a novel dataset of financial advisors' childhood residences, we show that advisors who grow up in U.S. counties with less ethical cultures are more likely to commit misconduct as adults. Our...

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought after by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors...

This paper examines heterogeneity in blockholder monitoring across investor type. We document which blockholder types (e.g. mutual funds, hedge funds) are more likely to be associated with active monitoring and show that firms targeted by such blockholders are more likely to increase the equity...