We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection...

This paper examines the relationship between investor protection and corporate insiders' incentive to take value-enhancing risks. In a poor investor protection environment corporations are often run by entrenched insiders who appropriate considerable corporate resources as personal benefits....

This paper examines the relationship between investor protection and corporate insiders' incentive to take value-enhancing risks. In a poor investor protection environment corporations are often run by entrenched insiders who appropriate considerable corporate resources as personal benefits....

We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection...

We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection...

We find that an increase in a firm's incentives to use trade secrets to protect its intellectual property results in a more actively managed capital structure. Exploiting U.S. states' adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a positive “shock” in the protection afforded to trade secrets,...