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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003785027
We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003464116
We develop a theory of firm scope and structure in which merging two firms allows the integrated firm's top management to allocate resources that are costly to trade. However, information about their use resides with division managers. We show that establishing truthful upward communication...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888114
We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317478
If managers and their subordinates have the same basic qualifications, then organizations can benefit from replacing unproductive superiors with more productive subordinates. In response to this threat, superiors may deliberately recruit unproductive subordinates, or abuse their personnel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126662
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003842575
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003784579
In many occupations, the consequences of agents' actions become known only over time. Firms can then pay agents based on early but noisy performance measures, or later but more accurate ones. I study this choice within a two-period model in which an agent's action generates an output with delay,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047169
This paper analyzes strategic bargaining between two agents each of whom negotiates on behalf of a principal. The principals face uncertainty about the bargaining skills of their agents as measured by the agents' abilities to assess the opponent's preferences. Agents then have an incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141019
Firms often learn about their own capabilities through their products' successes and failures. This paper explores the interaction between learning about capabilities and product strategy in a formal model. We consider a firm that can launch a sequence of products, where each product's success...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011807850