In infrastructure industries the permitted revenue of a regulated firm depends crucially on the choice of rate base and the allowed rate of return. In this paper we examine the impact of these two variables on the timing of the regulated firm's investment. Since the firm bears all the cost of...

We show that regulators' price-setting, rate base, and allowed rate of return decisions are inextricably linked. Once regulators switch from traditional rate of return regulation, the irreversibility of much infrastructure investment significantly alters the results of the usual approach to...

Commodities are physical, not financial, assets. We investigate the effects on equilibrium spot-price behavior of frictions in the storage process, which introduce an element of irreversibility to storage decisions and lead to periods when storage operators do not trade in the spot market. We...

Generators supplying electricity markets are subject to volatile input and output prices and uncertain fuel availability (water flows in the case of hydro and gas availability in the case of thermal plants). We show that a price-taking generator will only generate when the output price exceeds...

This paper uses a new model of a competitive electricity market to investigate the role of storage in markets dominated by hydro generation. Competition amongst generators leads to an endogenous shadow price of stored water, which facilitates the efficient intra-day and inter-season substitution...

The major diffculties in assessing market power in electricity wholesale spot markets mean that great weight should be placed upon assessing market outcomes against the fundamental determinants of supply, demand and competition. In this spirit we study whether the New Zealand market has been a...

Cooperative and mutual organisational forms arise for reasons that include contracting problems between parties. Economic literature suggests a variety of allocative inefficiencies implied by these forms that largely have their origins in poor investment decisions. We demonstrate that a...

Incentive regulation allows decentralised decision-making under regulatory parameters set on the basis of industry characteristics. When there is uncertainty, sunk costs, and flexibility in the timing of investment a monopoly will invest later than is socially desirable because it garners only a...