The financial reporting and disclosure problems at Enron, as well as the high market valuations for its stock raise troubling questions about the performance of capital market intermediaries, regulators and governance experts whose are supposed to ensure the effective functioning of the stock...

We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees....

This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. financial services sector. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion-type financial...

Bank executives' compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis, and reform of banker pay is high on the public policy agenda. While Congress targeted its reforms primarily at bankers' equity-based pay incentives, empirical research fails to show any...

Das internationale Bankensystem stand in den vergangenen Jahren im Fokus des öffentlichen Interesses. Bei der Diskussion möglicher Optionen zur Verbesserung der Finanzsystemstabilität rückt zunehmend die Corporate Governance in Banken in den Fokus. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht widmet...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks’ unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

The average publicly-traded firm pays its CEO millions of dollars in deferred compensation and defined-benefit pension commitments. Scholars debate whether firms use these payments to efficiently align managerial interests with those of creditors, or whether instead they represent “hidden”...

Inside debt compensation held by top officers of U.S. banks is negatively related to risk and risk-taking. The evidence reveals a robust and strongly negative relation between end-of-2006 inside debt and 2007-2009 bank-specific risk exposures in terms of lost stock market value, volatility, tail...

This study uses data from thrift institutions to provide new evidence on the relation between executive pay and firm performance. We find a positive and statistically significant relation between CEO pay and firm performance as measured by both return on assets and return on equity. Moreover,...