This paper analyzes strategic transfer pricing with risk and effort averse divisional managers. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the existence of a standard agency problem allows transfer pricing to serve as a commitment device even if the transfer prices are not mutually...

This paper analyzes the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms' headquarters will exclude their marketing division from the external input market and charge a transfer price above...

This paper compares the performance of transfer pricing and tidy cost allocations in a multiproduct firm in presence of output market competition and production externalities. In absence of competition, tidy cost allocations are creating inefficient allocations within the firm while transfer...

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies with the incentive schemes offered by the owners, then the well-known results of equilibrium incentive scheme (by Fershtman and Judd, 1987, A.E.R.) get modified. In case of...

Markets have a remarkable capacity for producing efficient resource allocations when information about relative values is dispersed across economic agents. We explore the use of market mechanisms inside the firm to address a resource allocation problem, and compare the outcome with the first-...

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems, ignoring the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. This paper develops a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns...

This article investigates the co-relationship of operating performance with implementation of ERP system in listed companies. The descriptive statistics reveals that the operating performance of ERP companies in 2003, that ROS, ROI, ROE and ROA regarded as companies' operating performance index...

We consider a principal-agent model where the agent is hired to take an action on behalf of the principal. The agent can exert costly effort to learn the true state of the world. If he fails to discover the state, he can end an inquiry to the principal who then can exert (additional) costly...

We study the feasibility and desirability of integrating ethics with traditional principal-agent theory. After discussing common objections and potential benefits, we present a principal-agent model that incorporates ethics in a manner that maintains the essential features of the traditional LEN...

We develop a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are privately informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or in exploration activities. Excessive delegation lead agents to inefficiently herd into exploration in an attempt to boost their market value. The...