Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and...

Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis - who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and "the right thing to do" - is evolutionarily stable, if it...

Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis - a type that has moral preferences with a morality parameter equal to...

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Wilson and Wilson, 2007; Boyd and Richerson, 2009; Simon, 2010; Simon et al., 2013; Luo, 2014; van Veelen et al., 2014; Luo and Mattingly, 2017). Cooperation...

Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis – who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and “the right thing to do” – is evolutionarily stable,...

Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis – a type that has moral preferences with a morality parameter equal...

Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis – who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and “the right thing to do” – is evolutionarily stable,...

Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and...