This study develops a dynamic model of information projection and explores how it affects timing of actions. An action is observable and available only after the agents' arrival. The value of an action is unknown; however, each agent receives a noisy signal on its value. Without information...

This study examines the effect of the principal’s control over the agent’s behavior in a dynamic principal-agent model with hidden information. We show the condition that the agent who has a similar preference for actions as the principal dares to choose the unpreferred action when the...

Consumer behavior observations warrant a rationale for backlash against aggressive marketing instruments like assertive ads. This study examines the effects of a principal's control over an agent's behavior, employing a dynamic principal-agent model with hidden information on the agent's...

We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known thatWalrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the...