We consider the problem of optimal information sharing in an unobservable single-server queue offering service at a fixed price to a Poisson arrival of delay-sensitive customers. The service provider observes the queue, and may share state information with arriving customers. The customers are...

We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relieson sharing information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a...

Individuals increasingly rely on social networking platforms to find information and form opinions. However, there are concerns on whether or how these platforms lead to extremism and polarization, especially since they typically aim to maximize engagement which may not align with other social...

Most school choice and other matching mechanisms are based on deferred acceptance (DA) for its incentive properties. However, non-strategyproof mechanisms can dominate DA in welfare because manipulation in preference rankings can reflect the intensities of underlying cardinal preferences. In...

A seller wants to sell an indivisible item to n buyers. The buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution, but the seller does not know this distribution; the seller only knows the support [a,b]. To be robust against the lack of knowledge of the environment and buyers' behavior, the...

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but the common prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an indivisible item to n buyers such that the buyers’...

We study the design of mechanisms without money for repeated allocation of resources among competing agents. Such mechanisms are gaining widespread use in allocating physical and/or computing resources in universities and companies, and also distributing of public goods like vaccines among...

We investigate the role of a class of alternative market structures known as electronic crossing networks or "dark pools''. Relative to traditional "lit'' markets, dark pools offer investors the trade-off of reduced transaction costs in exchange for greater uncertainty of trade. Our paper...

In many settings, resources are allocated among agents repeatedly over time without the use of monetary transfers: consider, for example, allocating server-time to company employees, rooms to students, or food among food banks. Here, the central challenge is to allocate resources efficiently...