Stock sales during takeover negotiations weaken the target Board's ability to recommend against the takeover, i.e., to resist. Sophisticated shareholders therefore face a coordination problem when deciding whether to sell-out early; and their actions generate a feedback loop between trading...

Investor time horizon varies by company, industry and economic system. In this paper we explore the importance of this variation by studying the impact of shareholder time horizon on the investment decisions of the firms they own, and externalities on the wider market. We demonstrate...

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks' risk and raise banks' values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved...

We study vertical contracting through bargaining between an upstream supplier and downstream retailers. We consider the effect of supplier uncertainty as to final volumes on the efficient bargains struck. Uncertainty causes retail price effects: large buyers wield countervailing power (deliver...

This study outlines a new theory linking industry structure to optimal employment contracts and executive short-termism. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remuneration...

This paper studies banker remuneration in a competitive market for banker talent. I model, and then calibrate, the default risk of the banks generated by investments and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on...

We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers (termed ‘bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets...

If a bank might be too-big-to-fail, then shareholders' optimal compensation contract encourages the executive to risk-shift on to the taxpayer. Standard risk-reducing regulatory compensation rules -- deferred pay, equity-linked pay, debt-like instruments in pay -- do not fully correct for...

We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination which can be implemented by a...

We study a firm with ethical employees who can adopt a profitable working practice that may harm their customers. Their response to this dilemma reflects their compensation contract as well as their ethical willpower. We identify optimal compensation contracts under utilitiarian and...