How do markets learn about central banks? Employing narrative evidence and futures data, Cieślak, Morse and Vissing-Jørgensen (2018) argue that private, informal channels systematically carry Federal Reserve information to markets around monetary-policy meetings. I complement their work with...

We develop a model where overconfident investors overestimate their own signal quality but are skeptical of others'. Those investors who are initially uninformed believe that the early informed have learned little, leading the former investors to provide excess liquidity, which, in turn, causes...

We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...

This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the...