Most studies analyzing the adjustments of workers to discrimination focus on sorting decisions, such as occupations workers pursue. We instead analyze on-the-job adjustments, focusing on the effects of discrimination by consumers. Specifically, using data from a couple of large-scale...

This thesis collects three papers that study applied problems in economics dealing with dynamic strategic behavior and imperfect information. In the first chapter I study the relationship between participation in United Nations Human Rights Treaties (HRT), foreign aid receipts and domestic human...

We derive marginal conditions of optimality (i.e., Euler equations) for a general class of Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) structural models. These conditions can be used to estimate structural parameters in these models without having to solve for or approximate value functions. This result...

We exploit a unique Swiss reform to identify the importance of passivity, claiming social security benefits at the Full Retirement Age (FRA). Sharp discontinuities generated by the reform reveal that raising the FRA while imposing small early claiming penalties significantly delays pension...

This paper deals with the identification and estimation of dynamic games when players’ beliefs about other players’ actions are biased, i.e., beliefs do not represent the probability distribution of the actual behavior of other players conditional on the information available....

We derive marginal conditions of optimality (i.e., Euler equations) for a general class of Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) structural models. These conditions can be used to estimate structural parameters in these models without having to solve for or approximate value functions. This result...

Most studies analyzing the adjustments of workers to discrimination focus on sorting decisions, such as occupations workers pursue. We instead analyze on-the-job adjustments, focusing on the effects of discrimination by consumers. Specifically, using extraordinary data from a large-scale...

This paper deals with the identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs about other players' actions are biased, i.e., beliefs do not represent the probability distribution of the actual behavior of other players conditional on the information available. First, we show...

This paper considers the problem of an imperfectly informed regulator constrained in his choice of environmental regulation by the political opposition of those affected by the policy. We compare the value of two types of information to the regulator: the social cost of pollution and the...

The convergence of policy choices across governments is often rationalized as the outcome of countries learning from each others experiences. However, policy convergence can also arise if policymakers fear being alone in their decisions, and have career concerns should they subsequently be...