We study patterns of CEO compensation in private family firms. We find that private family firms pay their CEO less than other private firms, and that the tendency of low CEO pay is stronger in family firms that have a family member as CEO. More than in other firms CEO pay in private family...

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors' increase of effort and firms' choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of...

We use a unique database on family relationships between CEOs, board members and owners of private Norwegian firms to examine earnings management priorities of private family firms. Consistent with agency theory we find that private family firms generally manage earnings downward compared with...

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors' increase of effort and firms' choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of...

This paper studies whether and how Big-4 firms provide higher quality audits than non-Big-4 firms. Specifically, we first examine a Big-4 effect and then explore three sources of the Big-4 effect. To test the Big-4 effect, we use a unique dataset of individual audit partners for a large sample...

This paper studies whether and how Big-4 firms provide higher quality audits than non-Big-4 firms. Specifically, we first examine a Big-4 effect and then explore three sources of the Big-4 effect. To test the Big-4 effect, we use a unique dataset of individual audit partners for a large sample...