I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types---and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex...

Transparent disclosures of public information might be one natural policy to reduce information inequality among individuals. We conduct a welfare analysis of such policy by introducing ex-ante heterogeneity in individuals' private information in a class of economies with dispersed information...

In this paper, I characterize neutral mechanisms for the provision of a public good. I show that neutral mechanisms form a reasonable set of predictions for mechanism selection in public goods problems; such predictions are sufficiently sharp, robust to a perturbation of the information...

I study bargaining over prices between two investors in financial over-the-counter markets with asymmetric information. I focus on environments in which an asset owner has private information about both her liquidity state and asset quality, and so a buyer is uncertain about the owner's true...

Countercyclical dispersion of firm outcomes (micro dispersion) is commonly used as a proxy for micro uncertainty. In this paper, we characterize conditions under which micro dispersion and micro uncertainty co-move positively in the context of a large Cournot economy with dispersed information...

Financial analysts may have strategic incentives to herd or to anti-herd when issuing forecasts of firms' earnings. This paper develops and implements a new test to examine whether such incentives exist and to identify the form of strategic behavior. We use the equilibrium property of the...

We study forecast dispersion in a finite-player forecasting game modeled as an aggregate game with payoff externalities and dispersed information. In the game, each agent cares about being accurate as well as about the distance of his forecast from the average forecast; and with a finite number...

Third-party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information. In this paper, I consider the selection of a third party in a two-person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative...