A classic argument in economic theory is that in a world of zero transaction costs the free bargaining among parties spontaneously leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Attempts have been made by many economists to apply such an argument to the field of politics. In contrast to market...

The paper starts with a theoretical reinterpretation of some classical topics in the public choice literature, where specific elements of contract theory and the theory of the firm are introduced. By putting into contact these completely different fields of economics, it defines a general...

Integrating many different elements from the main theories about nonprofit organizations, we define a model that leads to new results for the economic rationale of nonprofit firms. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which these firms can provide efficient levels of production in...

These notes offer an unusual perspective on democracy by interpreting key categories of political science through the lens of economics, specifically drawing from the ‘theory of the firm’ literature. Due to incomplete contracts, political power is conceptualized as a variable quantum that...