Corporate governance has been a hot issue across the world, especially since the Enron scandal and the Lehman shock. The Anglo-Saxon model (A-form), which focuses on monitoring management to maximize shareholder value through mechanisms such as hostile takeovers and independent directors, is...

In a family firm, the founding family has an influence over firm policy, corporate strategy, personnel issues, and so on, through ownership and participation in management even after the founder retires. Such family firms are prevalent among publicly traded firms not only in emerging countries,...

The monitoring model of the board of directors is influential worldwide despite being criticized from several perspectives. This article will examine the multi-dimensional roles—which include not only its monitoring role but also its role as a creator of synergistic effects—of the board from...

Joint ventures and venture companies present examples of the incomplete contract for economists and the relational contract for legal scholars. Although they have different practical settings, they share the issue of how parties manage the incentive for cooperation. The parties' ultimate goal is...

The biggest difference in the incentive bargains made in the venture capital industries in the US and Japan is that American entrepreneurs abandon control while Japanese entrepreneurs do not. Years ago, this difference was thought to be caused by a lack of liquid IPO markets by some experts in...

It has long been said that the Japanese corporate governance does not pay sufficient attention to shareholders as the owners of the corporation. And yet, despite this seeming lack of shareholder ownership, Japanese firms have performed quite well until recently. This paper seeks to solve this...

We can observe a typical two-sided agency problem between human capital providers (entrepreneurs) and monetary capital providers (venture capitalists) in a venture company. If one party feels too much risk, she will hesitate to invest her capital. To maximize each party's payoff, both parties...

The firm is a consecutive joint project among providers of indispensable capital, which includes both monetary capital and human capital, for the project. Like other joint projects, the firm cannot maximize the added value without achieving an efficient incentive bargain among those...

It has long been said that the Japanese corporate governance does not pay sufficient attention to shareholders as the owners of the corporation. An yet, despite this seeming lack of shareholder ownership, Japanese firms have performed quite well until recently. This paper seeks to solve this...