of losses and the question of whether and how to provide for continuity of clearing services. I discuss how one might …

In the event of a clearing member's default, and as part of its default management process, a central counterparty (CCP …. To mitigate this liquidity risk, CCPs often require members to post additional collateral to the initial margin, in the …-ons, this paper discusses the different approaches to incorporating market liquidity risk within a CCP's default waterfall and …

Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulation mandates the clearing of the CDS market through Central Clearing … theoretical results with parameter magnitudes and sensitivities. Examination of three market liquidity scenarios provides … intuition for effective liquidity injection by a Lender of Last Resort …

Recent regulation mandating the clearing of credit default swaps (CDS) by a Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP), has … well as, regulatory implications for a Lender of Last Resort in various liquidity scenarios …

. Moreover, although they mitigate credit risk, CCPs create liquidity risks, because they rely on participants to provide cash …. Such requirements increase with both market volatility and default; consequently, CCP liquidity needs are inherently … financial institutions default. Liquidity-focused macroprudential stress tests could help to assess and manage this systemic …

This paper investigates increased liquidity provision by market makers resulting from their ability to reduce balance …-by-trade data from sovereign bond markets, we show that liquidity provision by CCP members decreased to a lesser extent following …

Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we investigate central clearing in … suggest that central clearing always reduces counterparty risk for a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show … that this is not the case - mostly because of loss sharing. Central clearing can increase counterparty risk, particularly …

reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding … moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is … beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three …

reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding … moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is … beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three …

. Such a loss can be incurred whenever the CCP has insufficient funds to unwind the portfolio of a defaulting clearing member … show in particular that a clearing member's CCP risk is given by a sum of exposures to each of the other clearing members …