Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game‐theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure‐strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that...

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game-theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that a...

This paper studies the dependence structure of sparse networks realized according to a strategic model of network formation with homophilous agents. We argue that equilibrium selection and chains of indirect dependence generated by strategic interactions are the main drivers of network...

This paper studies inference on finite population average and local average treatment effects under limited overlap, meaning some strata have a small proportion of treated or untreated units. We model limited overlap in an asymptotic framework sending the propensity score to zero (or one) with...

Network data commonly consists of observations on a single large network. Accordingly, researchers often partition the network into clusters in order to apply cluster-robust inference methods. All existing such methods require clusters to be asymptotically independent. We show that for this...

We develop a methodology for proving central limit theorems in network models with strategic interactions and homophilous agents. We consider an asymptotic framework in which the size of the network tends to infinity, which is useful for inference in the typical setting in which the sample...

This paper studies causal inference in randomized experiments under network interference. Commonly used models of interference posit that treatments assigned to alters beyond a certain network distance from the ego have no effect on the ego's response. However, this assumption is violated in...

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game-theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that a...

This paper studies inference in models of discrete choice with social interactions when the data consists of a single large network. We provide theoretical justification for the use of spatial and network HAC variance estimators in applied work, the latter constructed by using network path...

We study nonparametric and regression estimators of treatment and spillover effects when interference is mediated by a network. Inference is nonstandard due to dependence induced by treatment spillovers and network correlated effects. We derive restrictions on the network degree distribution...