Foreign portfolio flows in and out of India are relevant for policymakers, and are often portrayed in the media as having a destabilizing effect on the domestic market. We use an event study approach to examine whether extreme global shocks trigger abnormal responses in foreign equity flows in...

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has...

Foreign portfolio flows in and out of India are relevant for policymakers, and are often portrayed in the media as having a destabilizing effect on the domestic market. We use an event study approach to examine whether extreme global shocks trigger abnormal responses in foreign equity flows in...

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has...

We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information by re-analyzing two models of preference evolution, the Arce (2007) employer-worker game and the Friedman and Singh (2009) Noisy Trust game. The techniques include extensions of replicator and...

This paper uses non-parametric methods to study the efficiency (Dybvig, 1988 and Post, 2003) and risk-profiles (Varian, 1988) of dynamic portfolio choices. We design an experiment which varies the number of states (complexity), and includes an equivalent static Arrow-Debreu problem. The results...

We design an experiment to study how reversible entry decisions are affected by public and private payoff disclosure policies. In our environment, subjects choose between a risky payoff, which evolves according to an autoregressive process, and a constant outside option payoff. The treatments...

Can an efficient correlated equilibrium emerge without any exogenous benevolent agent providing coordinating signals? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is...

We report on an experiment studying how traders react to stock splits and reverse splits. In the first environment, two assets have increasing fundamental values, and one asset is subject to a 2-for-1 share split while the other is not. In the second environment, the fundamental values of both...