We use corporate jet flight patterns to identify private meetings with investors that are ex ante unobservable to non-participants. Using approximately 400,000 flights, we proxy for private meetings with "roadshows," defined as three-day windows that include flights to money centers and to...

This paper investigates whether shareholders benefit from corporate social responsibility (CSR) by studying the effect of institutional investors on CSR. After all, arguing against CSR is hard when investors push for it. I find that longer investor horizons lead to significantly more CSR. This...

We examine overconfident CEO directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and foster higher attendance rates on boards. Boards with overconfident directors are more likely to...

This paper demonstrates the existence of different institutional investor preferences for equity characteristics, and makes the link between these preferences and firm value. We show that transient institutional investors (those that trade frequently with a view to maximizing short term gains)...

This study shows that trade creditors extend a negative response to hedge fund activism. Relative to control firms, target firms' accounts payable decreases by 28%, post activist intervention by hedge funds. This reduction is due to supply-side factors, highlighting suppliers' expropriation...

This paper studies institutional investors' incentives to be engaged shareholders. We measure incentives as the increase in an institution's cash flow (management fees) when a stockholding increases 1% in value, considering both the direct effect on assets under management and the indirect...

We examine whether institutions' monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal returns...

Using unique data on investor views of EDGAR company filings, we document that many investors devote significant effort towards governance research. However, investors' monitoring is focused disproportionately on large firms and firms with meetings outside the busy spring proxy season. Using an...

Using more than 30 million quarterly observations on investment funds, firms, and directors, we show that equity-ownership relationships between funds and directors comove when new firms appoint these directors. Funds follow directors from high operating performance and high valuation firms to...