Many commentators have suggested that companies pay top executives with deferred compensation, a type of incentive known as inside debt. Recent SEC disclosure reforms greatly increased the transparency of deferred compensation. We investigate stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies’...

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...

How do changes to stock price informativeness affect the mix of long-term and short-term pay? We answer this question using two exogenous shocks to price informativeness: the reduction in analyst coverage due to closure of brokerage houses and mutual-fund flow driven price pressure. Using the...

In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...

Measures of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) excess compensation are negatively related to future firm returns and operating performance. The effect is stronger for more overconfident CEOs at firms with weaker corporate governance. Overconfident CEOs receiving high excess pay undertake activities...

Research Question/Issue: Does inside debt compensation affect previous thought on compensation effects in IPOs? What explains variation in compensation when a company goes public? What is the composition of CEO compensation in an IPO? What types of compensation may be more optimal for or are...