This paper uses historical data on Texas banks to examine one possible reform to government-provided deposit insurance, increased reliance on market incentives. The Texas experience is unusual because banks faced two options under which they could join a state-mandated deposit insurance program,...

This paper explores the actions of the Bank of England and the Banque de France in promoting international economic stability during the mid-nineteenth century. The evidence presented below indicates that the Bank of England acted in concert with the Bank of France, through France's reliance on...

Using recently collected examination data from a sample of Texas state-chartered banks over the period 1919-26, the role of moral hazard in increasing ex-ante asset risk is analyzed. During this period, a state-run deposit insurance system was in place that was mandatory for all state-chartered...

In 1910, Texas instituted a highly unique deposit insurance program for its state chartered banks consisting of two separate plans: the depositors guaranty fund, similar in operation to the deposit insurance schemes adopted in several other states; and the depositors bond security system, which...

In his comment on our 2002 Journal of Economic History paper, Gary Richardson (2007) proposes that our work specifies moral hazard too narrowly. Richardson posits that fixed-rate deposit insurance leads to moral hazard which takes many forms. These include not only the usual notion of...