For a number of applications of signaling, it is sometimes more reasonable to assume that senders rather than nature choose their unobserved features (e.g. their private choices of quality). In other situations, it makes no sense for nature to determine senders' unobserved features (e.g. their...

We present a fictitious-play model of bargaining, where two bargainers play the Nash demand game repeatedly. The bargainers make a deliberate decision on their demands in the initial period and then follow a fictitious play process subsequently. If the bargainers are patient, the set of epsilon...

We study two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with complete information and endogenous agenda, where each issue is associated with a finite set of alternatives. In both procedures, when bargaining frictions are small, we find a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including...

We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative...

We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous unrestricted agenda, in which offers can be made in any subset of outstanding issues. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for this procedure to have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium agreement.

We study a model of Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot commit a signal to the receiver so that he can lie on the signal. The sender can choose an announced signal differently from a private real signal and should bear a cost of lying. The receiver only observes the announced signal and...

We provide a new interpretation of the Nash solution, using fictitious play. We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property almost everywhere, and present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately implement the Nash solution. Thanks to the exact implementation...

We study a vertically differentiated duopoly with quadratic production costs where firms are uncertain about consumer taste distribution. We find two key results. First, when the quality difference is relatively greater (smaller) than the difference in the two firms' costs, uncertainty increases...

This chapter surveys the economics literature on wireless communications. Wireless communications and the economic goods and services that utilise it have some special characteristics that have motivated specialised studies. First, wireless communications relies on a scarce resource rights for...