On one hand, managers, and especially CEOs, are hired and paid to exercise their managerial discretion. On the other hand, within the agency theory approaches to corporate governance, managerial discretion is a source of moral hazard to be removed by incentives or monitoring. In this paper we...

Informed by agency theory, the dominant theory and practice of CEO pay both exclude non-monetary incentives and treat money itself as pure exchange value. Drawing on the economics of non-monetary incentives and the sociology of money, we use qualitative evidence from UK FTSE100 CEOs, to...

This paper draws on 59 depth interviews with FTSE100 CEOs and chairmen to extend the literature on strategy-as-practice to the practice of strategy as perceived by large company CEOs. We find that strategy for this group is effectively synonymous with vision and direction and that its practice...

In this paper we draw on Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory, and in particular his concept of an 'episode', to guide research into strategic practice and its relationship to the operating routines of an organization. Episodes, in Luhmann's theory, provide a mechanism by which a system can...