There are two main creditors in commercial real estate: arm's-length investors and banks. We model commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) as the less informed source of credit. In equilibrium, these investors fund properties with a low probability of distress and banks fund properties that...

When collateral is safe, there are less opportunities for things to go wrong. We examine matching between collateral and creditors in the commercial real estate mortgage market by comparing loans in commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) conduits and bank portfolios. We model CMBS...

We analyze the effects of market structure on the branching decisions of three types of depository institution: multimarket banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions. We argue that additional branches increase quality for an institution's consumers, and examine the interaction between...

We assess the competitive impact that single-market banks and thrift institutions have on multi-market banks (and vice-versa) in 1,884 non-MSA markets. We estimate a model of equilibrium market structure which endogenizes entry for three types: multi-market banks, single-market banks, and thrift...

This paper introduces a simple method to test between two general approaches to defining bank and thrift product markets. I estimate two models that endogenize market structure using data on banks and thrifts from 1,884 rural markets for the year 2000. The first model assumes that banks and...

U.S. markets for outpatient substance abuse treatment (OSAT) include clinics that are private for-profit, private non-profit, and public (i.e., government-run). We study the market structure of OSAT using recently-developed methods from the empirical industrial organization literature on...