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Bargaining in Legislatures : A New Donation Paradox
Montero, Maria - 2022
It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081559
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Bargaining in standing committees
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578203
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Bargaining in the presence of condorcet cycles : the role of asymmetries
Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532580
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Multilateral bargaining in networks : on the prevalence of inefficiencies
Lee, Joosung - 2015
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
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The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining : A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments
Baranski, Andrzej - 2020
We collected and analyzed the data sets of all majoritarian Baron and Ferejohn (1989 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.) experiments through 2018. By exploiting the variation of experimental parameters such as group size and discount factor we are able to test whether or not the theoretical point predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840441
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Learning in the WTO/DDA Negotiations? : An Experimental Study
Sung, Hankyoung - 2016
to real multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in the World Trade Organizations (WTO …). This paper argues that the structure of games including a veto player (Veto games) is similar to the WTO/DDA negotiations … negotiations and policy options for choosing partners for winning coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003266
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Strategic Alliances in Coalitional Bargaining
Lee, Joosung - 2018
To analyze players' strategic alliance behavior, we introduce a new noncooperative coalitional bargaining model, in which each player can buy out other players with upfront transfers. We uncover the role of an essential player in a transferable utility game, or a veto player in a simple game, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922042
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Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the Eu's Conciliation Committee
Napel, Stefan; Widgren, Mika - 2021
The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful "codecision makers", understanding of the final stage of the procedure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319781
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Open rule legislative bargaining
Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2020 - This version: October 8, 2020
We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It is widely known that there are significant gaps...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012310731