This paper considers the solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set that admit a potential function. We say that a solution admits a potential function if the solution is given as the marginal contribution according to the potential function. Hart and Mas-Collel (1989) show that the...

Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core of cooperative games with transferable utility. We first characterize balanced games, i.e., the set of games with a nonempty core, through geometric properties. We show that the set of balanced games generates a...

In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then...

This study identifies stable coalition structures in generalized patent li- censing games with a specified payment scheme. In the model, each firm can agree to an exclusive contract with an external patent licensor for the patented technology on process innovation based on an ad-valorem (profit)...

Dana Scott provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a given probability capacity can be decomposed into a unique additive probability and a unique strictly increasing distortion function. Given this result, we characterize a family of preferences defined over the lottery acts (the...

Dana Scott provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a given probability capacity can be decomposed into a unique additive probability and a unique strictly increasing distortion function. Given this result, we characterize a family of preferences defined over the lottery acts (the...