Similar Search Results

Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies

Horstmann, Niklas - 2018

We systematically investigate the relationship between the number of firms in a market and tacit collusion by means of a meta-analysis of the literature on oligopoly experiments as well as two of our own experiments with a total of 368 participants. We show that the degree of tacit collusion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937619

How the design of cartel fines affects prices : evidence from the lab

Engilbertsson, Sindri; Onderstal, Sander; Treuren, Leonard - 2025

cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence … test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where subjects can form cartels, which allows them to discuss pricing at … in market prices across treatments is fully driven by cartel prices. While these results align with the theoretical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015211665

Collusion under Payoff Fluctuations

Yasuda, Yosuke - 2012

Theoretical literature on collusion has focused on a specific formulation of payoff fluctuations, namely by demand shocks, and showed that payoff fluctuations are bad for collusion. Introducing general payoff fluctuations, we show that (i) payoff fluctuations may strictly reduce the minimum...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116979

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

On globally optimal punishments in the repeated cournot game

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2016

We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703311

Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2014

Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011725688

Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Tacit Collusion

Delbono, Flavio - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045206

Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games

Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, … - 2022

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295651

Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games

Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, … - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487322

Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

hypothesis we run an experiment where participants play two consecutive Bertrand pricing games: first a standard version without …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547790