This paper analyses a simultaneous game of network formation and information acquisition where the benefit structure is such that the benefit that an agent derives from the network she is located in depends on the maximum information that someone in her neighbourhood, including herself,...

This paper is a contribution to the literature on efficient assignment of liabilities for accidental losses arising out of two party interactions involving negative externalities. The objective is to examine the requirements that efficiency imposes on rules for the assignment of liabilities for...

This paper introduces a new mechanism through which positive externality spills over in a network. We find that the introduction of the new spillover mechanism plays a major role in reducing the set of Nash equilibrium though at the same time it increases the set of stable equilibria in a...

The main purpose of this paper is to show that the conflict between the considerations involving economic efficiency and those of distributive justice, in the context of assigning liability, is not as sharp as is generally believed to be the case. The condition of negligence liability which...