We consider a model where each individual (or ethnic minority) is embedded in a network of relation-ships and decides whether or not she wants to be assimilated to the majority norm. Each individual wants her behavior to agree with her personal ideal action or norm but also wants her behavior to...

Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. We examine the robustness of this result to the presence of a much more general class of commitments: partially revocable commitments.

Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. We examine the robustness of this result to the presence of a much more general class of commitments: partially revocable commitments.

In this paper we study cultural diversity in values or personal norms concerning effort or work ethics, the related and observable diversity in behavior and its economic consequences. Our goal is to investigate the impact on this type of cultural diversity of primitive economic and behavioral...

We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor’s capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment...

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when...