The probability for shareholder litigation is studied and how corporate governance characteristics and other factors explain it. Shareholder litigation results from failure of corporate governance. Thus a better quality of corporate governance is hypothesized to decrease the litigation...

We construct game theoretic foundations for bargaining in the shadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have noisy signals of a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offers to settle. If the offers cross, they settle on the average offer; otherwise, both litigants incur an...

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....

We study the effect of legal risk on firms' investment. Using legal risk measures based on the number of litigious words in SEC 10-K filings, we find legal risk reduces investment. Underlying mechanisms include both i) a financing channel, whereby legal risk reduces credit ratings, increases...