We investigate the performance and its link with information asymmetry, corporate governance and legal enforcement of insider transactions in 36 countries covering 10 Asian countries, 20 European countries and 6 countries in the rest. The results show that abnormal returns after insider trading...

Theories of corporate boards assume that board members of a firm generate private information about the quality and performance of its CEO in the process of monitoring and advising him, and may use this information to decide whether or not to fire him. In this paper, I make use of data on...

Many researchers have conducted experiments to study different aspects of insider trading. Experimental laboratory asset markets allow the researcher to control parameters that are impossible to control or even measure in empirical data (e.g., fundamental value of the asset, quality and quantity...

We examine whether Basu's (1997) differential timeliness metric and the related C-Score metric are effective in detecting predictable differences in conservatism surrounding corrections of overstated earnings. Cross-sectional and time-series analyses, employing 2,132 firms making restatements...

This paper analyzes the information asymmetry between owners/managers and creditors. More specifically, the research investigates the role of both disclosure on financial key performance indicators (FKPIs) and different corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the agency costs of debt. The...

I show that nonroutine premerger trades by acquirer outside directors contain a significant amount of private information and indicate opportunistic trading on the information. I find that outside directors sell shares before less valuable deals and purchase shares before more value enhancing...

Equity crowdfunding markets have grown exponentially over the last few years. Despite this impressive growth, significant informational asymmetry problems may plague these markets, making them susceptible to difficulties and even market failure. In this paper, we depart from current equity...