Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

This article examines the regulation of directors remuneration in EU, UK and Belgian law. The author argues that there are two categorises of norms for the regulatory framework of directors remuneration: one is market-based, market efficiency norms of agency costs; the other is socio-legal...

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

This research analyses small and medium enterprises directors' sensitivity to CSR, and more specifically to workplace wellbeing and risk management. We conducted a questionnaire survey of 1,800 directors of Belgian small and medium enterprises to determine their perceptions and actions regarding...

Pre-World War I Belgium was characterized by a strong concentration of power in the hands of a small elite with ties to business, banks, and politics. We find that political and upper class connections were widespread amongst listed firms, especially connections with the ruling political party....