Most nations have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by locking down parts of their economies to reduce infectious spread. The optimal timing of the beginning and end of the lockdown, together with its intensity, is determined by the tradeoff between economic losses and improved health outcomes....

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of “swapping” individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the...

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the "span of interaction". Trade is governed by a prisoner's dilemma "rule of engagement". A farmer's payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner's...

Health care systems need to be resilient to deal with disasters like the global spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) on top of serving the changing needs of a multi-morbid, ageing and often dispersed population. This paper identifies, discusses and augments...

Various jurisdictions are legalising not just cannabis possession and use, but also large-scale commercial production, distribution and sale. Potential problems with that form of legalization raise questions about how best to implement a legalisation. This paper analyses the interests of the...

This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decision-makers of the game (“The West” and “International...

A central objective of modern US housing policy is deconcentrating poverty through "housing mobility programs" that move poor families into middle class neighborhoods. Pursuing these policies too aggressively risks inducing middle class flight, but being too cautious squanders the opportunity to...

This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decision-makers of the game (“The West” and “International...