Ownership has been identified as a key mechanism in corporate governance. Agency theory suggests that high levels of ownership provide increased incentive for shareholders to monitor firm management which should lead to better firm performance. However, not every shareholder may have the same...

International business researchers have extensively studied entry mode choice, but only a very few studies have examined whether anticipated entry modes by determinants would lead to higher firm performance. By analyzing approximately 17,000 foreign entries in seven industries into China from...

This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by...

How does a board of directors respond to stringent transnational regulations on corporate governance? We explore this question in a case study that includes interviews with key governance actors of a bank dealing with regulatory changes in the European Union (EU) initiated in 2010 in response to...

We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity. Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior...

This study investigates whether the governance attributes of Brazilian companies are associated with voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure. Results show that Brazilian companies voluntarily disclose very little about their ESO plans, and that board size, presence of a compensation...