This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

We examine public firms' issues of private and public debt, convertibles, and common equity securities. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market. We find that asymmetric information plays a...

We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure, in which companies give material information only to a few analysts...

We examine a comprehensive set of public firms' issues of private and public debt, convertibles and common equity securities. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market, with 81\% of small public...

This paper identifies a new corporate governance mechanism: sharing control. We show that bargaining problems among multiple controlling shareholders may prevent inefficient investment decisions that harm minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems may block efficient investment...

We examine a comprehensive set of private and public security issuance decisions by publicly traded companies. We study private and public issues of debt, convertibles and common equity securities - a total of 6 different security-market choices. The market for public firms issuing private...