We develop a model which combines general risk-averse preferences with anticipated loss aversion to explain bidding behavior in the first-price auction, where both risk-aversion and loss aversion induce ‘overbidding.' We then show that the nonparametric utility function and loss aversion...

We study a model that combines bidder-specific risk-averse preferences with anticipated loss aversion to explain bidding in induced value first-price auctions. We first show that, like risk-aversion, loss aversion causes ‘overbidding,’ relative to the bidding without risk and loss aversion....

We run experiments of first-price auctions with two groups, by which we directly detect the presence of bidders’ loss-aversion. Each human bidder bids against three preprogrammed computer bidders. The computer bidders independently draw their values from the uniform distribution and bid their...

I propose a Bayesian method to analyze bid data from first-price auctions under private value paradigms. I use a series representation to specify the valuation density so that bidding monotonicity is always satisfied, and I impose density affiliation by the nonparametric technique of Beresteanu...

In this paper, we relax the hard closure property of experiments that have been used to study endowment effect in laboratory. We study differences in benchmark environments (hard closure) and an environment that allows participants to reverse the decisions taken in the laboratory (soft closure)....

In this paper, we relax the hard closure property of experiments that have been used to study endowment effect in laboratory. We study differences in benchmark environments (hard closure) and an environment that allows participants to reverse the decisions taken in the laboratory (soft closure)....