Showing 1 - 10 of 247,186
We develop a model of individual prosecutors (and teams of prosecutors) to address the incentives for the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Our model assumes that each individual prosecutor trades off a desire for career advancement (by winning a case) and a disutility for knowingly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919770
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487487
well. This paper proposes a positive theory for judicial torture. It is shown that torture reflects the magistrate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207641
We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173797
In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric information about the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173800
Mistakes, incompetence and malfeasance in our criminal justice system can have serious and lifelong consequences on the person prosecuted, and can compromise the public’s belief in the system. Although much has been examined regarding small sample sets of individuals for whom there is uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128900
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types of offenders, sophisticates and naïves. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913196
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types of offenders, sophisticates and naïves. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864423
We extend the analysis of optimal self-reporting schemes to situations like corruption where two individuals are required for a criminal act. This leads to strategic interactions in the self-reporting stage, because the fine can be made dependent on whether the accomplice self-reports or not....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122739
We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014225035