Using the concept of global democratic retreat as a background, this article analyses the particular case of abuses committed by intelligence agents working for the US Department of Commerce (DOC) over a 16-year period. Given the complexity of the case, we approach it from different vantage...

The local economical development is part of the general logic for the decentralization process, offering substance to the local autonomy, because we can’t assure at local level only the obligation for the assurance of administrative activities, keeping at the same time the economic levers in...

The lower Mekong Delta, one of the largest river deltas in Asia, is a landscape shaped by the waters of the Mekong River that flows, as last part of its long way from the Tibetan Plateau to the South Chinese Sea, through a dense river and canal network in the Southwest of Vietnam. People in this...

Latin American countries face the challenge of rebuilding their institutional systems, diminished in some of its essential functions as a result of economic reforms and policies implemented, with varying degrees of intensity, in most nations of the region. The identification of the poor results...

An incentive-compatibility framework for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs is applied to the sponsor’s problem of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the sponsor. Rather, the bureau must announce a marginal...

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agro-ecosystem services. Firstly, we...

Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from...

Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more...

We analyze the implications of plausible third-party challenges to the legitimacy of a transaction for contract design. To the extent that such challenges impose reputation and transaction costs, the scrutinized agent has an incentive to choose contractual procedures that make challenges less...

We study the role of culture on bribing attitudes in a new dynamic bribery game, where the purpose of bribing is to receive a service earlier by bribing to queue-jump. Our queue-jumping game allows us to distinguish between two classes of bribes: (i) queue-jumping bribes, which aim to increase...