This Discussion paper has been substantially revised, and is now available under the title "Why do promises affect trustworthiness, or do they?" in Experimental Economics, June 2016, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 382–393; http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10683-015-9444-1 We set out to test...

An informed advisor may have incentives to send a biased advice to an uninformed decisionmaker. We set up an experiment to study whether disclosure of the advisor's interests can foster truthfulness and trust. A key feature of our experiment is that we measure how advisors expect decisionmakers...

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information.The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

We evaluate the impact of technology adoption subsidies on investment behavior in an individual choice experiment. In a laboratory setting professional managers are confronted with an intertemporal decision problem in which they have to decide whether or not to search for, and possibly adopt, a...

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

On an increasing scale auctions are used to allocate the licenses to operate on markets which are thought not suited for free entry. According to standard economic arguments, the license fees paid at the auction will not affect consumer prices since they constitute a sunk cost. This standard...

We study an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which redistributional transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Supporting the old is a purely inter-generational (intra-family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an...

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...